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Abstract 
The theory of the optimal allocation of risk and the Townsend Thai panel data on 
financial transactions are used to assess the impact of the major formal and informal 
financial institutions of an emerging market economy. We link financial institution 
assessment to the actual impact on clients, rather than ratios and non-performing loans. 
We derive both consumption and investment equations from a common core theory with 
both risk and productive activities. The empirical specification follows closely from this 
theory and allows both OLS and IV estimation. We thus quantify the consumption and 
investment smoothing impact of financial institutions on households including those 
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running farms and small businesses. A government development bank (BAAC) is shown 
to be particularly helpful in smoothing consumption and investment, in no small part 
through credit, consistent with its own operating system, which embeds an implicit 
insurance operation. Commercial banks are smoothing investment, largely through 
formal savings accounts. Other institutions seem ineffective by these metrics.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been little theory-based assessment of formal and informal financial 
institutions which uses not only financial statements and institutional detail but also 
household panel data on actual customers. Here we explicitly incorporate the diversity of 
shocks across households in an environment with productive opportunities in a choice 
model of financial participation. We use the theory of an optimal allocation of risk-
bearing to derive both consumption and investment equations for customers of financial 
institutions. We also do the same for those in financial autarky. Finally, we make 
participation endogenous and evaluate the formal and informal financial institutions that 
offer savings, credit and insurance. 
We make use of the Townsend Thai data, a panel of approximately 960 
households, including about 200 running their own businesses. The data start in May 
1997, just prior to the onset of the July 1997 financial crisis, and continue through 2001, 
that is, through the recovery. Thus there is macro, aggregate risk.1 The data are gathered 
from households and small businesses specialized in different mixes of occupations and 
subject to different shocks. Thus, there is ample idiosyncratic risk.2 The data contain the 
measurements of consumption, investment, and income necessary to carry out the 
                                                 
1 In the working paper version (Alem and Townsend, 2004), we show that consumption drops across both 
surveyed regions in the first three years. Surprisingly however, the few statistically significant common 
time effects in income over households explain little of the income variation. Droughts, floods and price 
changes are events that drive much income change according to the surveyed households, but these are not 
uniform within and across regions. 
2 In the working paper version (Alem and Townsend, 2004), we show that wage earners and those in 
agriculture suffered lower declines in income than anticipated in the Thai government’s policy response, 
and business owners suffered large declines in income on average. Within each of the occupation groups 
there is enormous heterogeneity income change. 
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standard risk-bearing or equivalent-with-complete-market tests. Further, the data record 
the actual use of formal and informal financial institutions and mechanisms by type of 
financial product, both borrowing and saving. From this we can see which devices are 
used and gauge the plausibility of econometric instruments for subsequent actual 
participation. The instruments are derived from a baseline key informant interviews and 
from a baseline 1996 village-level census from the Community Development Department 
(CDD). One of the instruments makes use of a Geographic Information System (GIS).  
The principal findings offer a score card or rating system for the major financial 
institutions of the country. A government development bank (BAAC) is shown to be 
particularly helpful in smoothing consumption and investment, in no small part through 
credit, consistent with its own operating system, which embeds an implicit insurance 
operation. Commercial banks are smoothing investment, largely through formal savings 
accounts. Other institutions seem ineffective by these metrics   
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in the analysis. 
In Section 3, we present the basic choice model of financial regimes featuring the 
assumed environment. In Section 4, we derive from the theory of optimal allocation of 
risk the explicit consumption and investment equations used in the empirical work. In 
Section 5, we do the same for those in financial autarky. In Section 6, we derive the 
econometric specification, including how we use the data and our instruments. The 
assessed impact of each major financial institution is summarized in Section 7. Section 8   
provides additional results and interpretation. Section 9 concludes. 
2. Data and Institutions 
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The panel data used in this paper come from a project funded by the National 
Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Ford Foundation (see 
Townsend, 1997). An initial cross-sectional survey, with retrospective data, was fielded 
in May, 1997, before the crisis that began with the devaluation of the Thai baht in July, 
1997. Two regions were chosen deliberately: namely, the more developed Central region 
and the relatively poor, semi-arid Northeast. Within each region two provinces were 
chosen deliberately as each had at least one county (amphoe) that had been randomly 
selected in all previous rounds of the larger Socio-Economic Survey (SES). In the Central 
region the province of Chachoengsao is adjacent to Bangkok and contains an industrial 
corridor that makes its way to the eastern seaboard. The province of Lopburi is in the 
fertile central valley north of Bangkok. In the Northeast, the province of Sisaket is the 
poorest in Thailand according to provincial product data, and Buriram, also in the 
Northeast, represents a transition province as one moves west back toward Bangkok. 
Within each province twelve tambons or sub-counties were chosen at random (see 
Binford, Lee, and Townsend, 2004). Within each tambon, four villages were chosen at 
random from an enumeration of villages available from the Community Development 
Department (CDD), and within each village fifteen households were chosen at random 
from a listing held by the headman.3 In addition to the household questionnaire, survey 
instruments were designed for the headman of each village, soliciting in particular a 
retrospective village history of the use of formal and quasi-formal financial institutions.  
                                                 
3 The mean and median numbers of villages in a tambon are 10.38 and 10.0 respectively. Thus, the fraction 
of villages chosen from the total is approximately 40%. The sampling rate for tambons in a province is 3% 
and the sampling rate for households in a village is 11%. 
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With the advent of the crisis, funding from the Ford Foundation allowed a 
resurvey one year later (in May, 1998) of one-third of the original sample, and this was 
continued with NICHD funding into subsequent years. The data used in this paper is 
through 2001. For this Townsend Thai resurvey panel, four tambons were chosen at 
random from the original twelve of each province.4 Otherwise, the same villages and the 
same households were selected for re-interviews. The target number of households was 
960, or 240 in each province. The actual response rate for this 1997-1998 pairing is 
relatively high, for example, 98.2% of the target 1997 households respond again to the 
resurvey. Likewise, there were successful re-interviews of 96.2%, 97.1% and 96.5% for 
the other pairs of years. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix contain a summary of key 
variables used in the data analysis.   
 Measurement of income, consumption and investment. We note that income is 
measured as the difference between gross income and gross expenses, solicited from the 
household for each occupation category separately: business, agriculture, fish/shrimp, 
farming and livestock. Labor income is gross revenue from wages. Likewise, all physical 
assets held at each interview date are solicited along with purchase date and value at that 
time. Discrepancies in ownership across interviews are checked and reconciled with the 
households directly. Depreciation rates, e.g., 10%, can be applied to create retrospective 
panel data on wealth. There are, in addition, direct questions on land sales and 
acquisitions, the major asset in many cases (this is not depreciated). Consumption is 
                                                 
4 With the exception that one tambon was set aside for a separate intensive monthly survey. 
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measured by a solicitation of 13 items5 that best predict aggregated non-durable 
consumption expenditure in the larger more comprehensive Socio-Economic Survey. In 
practice, 50-80% of the variation can be explained by these 13 items. A price index at the 
province level was obtained using average prices of purchases of consumption in order to 
deflate and express income, consumption and investment in real terms.6 Specifically, the 
Townsend Thai annual data records both the overall value and quantity of the first 9 
consumption items purchased by each surveyed household. There is a considerable range 
for these deduced prices for a given year and province, and so in order to reduce 
measurement error and provide a reliable overall central tendency, the top and bottom 
25% of the histogram for each item are removed, then a simple average is taken. The 
overall price index is constructed by weighting each price item by its quantity in the base 
year (Laspeyres). 
 Measurement of financial participation. Membership in or being a customer of 
the various financial institutions was solicited in the 1997 interview, along with a 
retrospective history. Hence, we know in principle if a household was using a 
commercial bank in, for example, the 1996 baseline year, the year prior to the survey. We 
also have measurements of all subsequent financial transactions (borrowing, lending, 
saving) with the formal sector (type of institution, e.g., BAAC, village funds such as 
Production Credit Groups [PCGs], commercial banks) and with the informal sector 
                                                 
5 Grain, milk and milk products, meat, alcohol consumed at home, alcohol consumed away, tobacco, 
gasoline, ceremonies, house repairs, vehicle repairs, educational expenses, clothing and meals away from 
home. 
6 As a robustness check, a national deflator price index was obtained from the National Statistics Office and 
the results, though statistically weaker, did not vary in sign and order of magnitude. 
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(output purchaser, money lender, friends, relatives, store owners). There are also data on 
remittances and the use of rice in storage.  
 Financial institutions overview. We emphasize here that we have the typical 
array of financial institutions of emerging market economies: government banks, local 
savings and loans, a private (but regulated) commercial banking sector and, again, a 
substantial informal sector.  
 BAAC is the Thai government’s Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives. It makes modestly sized loans, about half with joint liability and hence no 
physical collateral. Its interest rate is slightly subsidized, and the BAAC could break even 
by raising its on-lending rate only a modest amount (Yaron, 1994). The BAAC does 
compete actively for savings deposits (as commercial banks are no longer required to 
deposit funds). Though nominally lending to agriculture (fertilizer, seed), business 
households in the Townsend Thai survey sometimes report that they get initial funding 
from the BAAC. Most loans are short term, but long term investment is also possible. 
The BAAC has focused on getting credit to a certain segment of farmers, and in the data 
it appears they are more willing to lend off the main road, away from towns. The BAAC 
had 34% of all loans outstanding in the larger 1997 baseline survey and focuses on the 
middle wealth segment of the market in each village. Townsend and Yaron (2001) have 
featured the “risk-contingency” nature of lending, in which delayed repayment and 
possibly reduced interest and/or principal is part of the BAAC operating system. This 
presumably is a mechanism which would allow mitigation of idiosyncratic shocks, 
though that has not been tested previously.  
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Commercial banks make relatively few loans in the Townsend Thai peri-urban 
data, 3% of all loans in the 1997 data, but loan size is relatively large, larger than all other 
lenders. So, by value, commercial banks have 16% of all loans. Bank lending is clustered 
in the sense that if a commercial bank is active in a village, it is likely to be active nearby, 
and there remain plenty of gaps. Virtually all commercial bank loans require collateral. 
On the other hand, commercial bank savings account for 56% of all savings, especially 
for higher wealth households and those in more developed regions.   
Agricultural Cooperatives are now part of the Bank for Agriculture and 
Agricultural Cooperatives, but many retain their former quasi-independent status, run by 
local boards and so on. The BAAC on-lends to Cooperatives and historically suffers a 
lower repayment rate than with direct loans to customers. 
Village level financial institutions appear frequently. One of the more common 
types is a Production Credit Group, essentially a local savings and loan run by a village 
committee. There are also women’s groups, rice banks, buffalo banks, poverty 
eradication funds, and others, though sample size in the annual panel did not allow us to 
do much with these.7 The well-known and larger One Million Baht Village Funds, 
analyzed in Kaboski and Townsend (2011; 2012) were not introduced until 2002, and we 
do not use that data here. 
The informal sector comprises approximately half of all loans, not only from 
money lenders but also from store keepers, traders, friends, relatives, and so on. There is 
great variety in collateral, interest rates and repayment. We also think of rice storage as 
                                                 
7 See Kaboski and Townsend (2005) for a more detailed description and analysis using the 1997 data. 
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an activity of the informal sector, distinct from savings in commercial banks or the 
BAAC. Rice accounts for 14% of all savings (excluding the value of cash, gold, and 
jewelry which are not measured in the annual data).   
Instruments for financial participation. We also employ the CDD data, a 
comprehensive village-level census and the key informant questionnaire to obtain 
instruments for membership of formal and informal institutions: (i) key informant 
responses regarding the availability of productive credit in the village from various 
specific financial institutions; (ii) travel times to district centers as measured in CDD 
data; and (iii) GIS-calculated probabilities based on CDD neighborhood averages that a 
village will have each of the various financial institutions. 
As in the Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model, we test for the impact of 
financial sector participation versus non-participation on the ability to smooth 
consumption and investment. We do this for each institution, one at a time. Other 
strategies could be followed, though enumerating all possible combinations would be 
tedious, and it is not clear if our instruments are appropriate.8   
 
3. A Choice Model of Financial Participation 
                                                 
8 Ongoing work explores whether combinations of service providers might be a key to effectiveness. 
Kinnan and Townsend (forthcoming) look at village kinship networks and chains of gifts and loans which 
link households if only indirectly to primary formal sector providers. Sripakdeevong and Townsend (2010) 
study the role of informal sector bridge loans to mitigate adverse impacts of repaying when formal sector 
loans are due. But in this paper, our instruments for the informal sector are already not working well. Note 
also that time to the district center in Table 2 below is positively correlated with BAAC use and negatively 
correlated with commercial bank use. 
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To assess the impact of financial institutions on households, we follow a modified 
version of the financial choice model of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). In the model, 
households choose whether to become a member of a financial institution by weighing 
the costs and benefits of participation. On the one hand, as in Townsend (1978, 1983), we 
assume that financial institutions are costly to establish or to learn to use. Specifically, 
household i has to pay a once-and-for-all lump-sum cost Zi to become a member of a 
financial institution, incurred at the time of joining. This captures initial household 
specific learning costs and more generally the cost of bank infrastructure itself. On the 
other hand, financial participation entails important potential benefits. Financial 
institutions collect and process information on project returns, and this allows 
participating households to achieve higher expected returns, essentially by coordinating 
production activities. Financial institutions also allow households to diversify away 
idiosyncratic risk, essentially by pooling returns. More generally, we interpret financial 
institutions as providing households access to better information and as-if-complete-
markets, and we then compare the consumption and investment implications of 
members/customers of financial institutions to those in financial autarky.  
Thus we start with a common environment, with risk and investment, and then 
consider two financial regimes. One regime is the full information, full risk-sharing 
regime, which comes from a programming problem for the determination of Pareto 
optimal allocations; the other regime is autarky. Each of these regimes gives us guidance 
about how to handle the actual variables and what to look for in the data.  
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To simplify, we imagine the decision of whether or not to join the financial 
system is taken at the initial date, t = 0. Thus, in empirical terms, all decisions before and 
during 1996 are encapsulated in the t = 0 decision. In the model, no one who has incurred 
the cost of entry and joined will ever, subsequently, give up the advantages of the 
financial system and exit, and this is largely true in the data, from 1997 on.9 The 
participation decision is described in more detail below, and it makes clear that there may 
be information that a household has, that the econometrician does not see, which can 
show up later in correlations between right-hand side variables and error terms. For this 
and other reasons it is important to control for selection, with instruments, in the 
empirical work.  
Environment. The underlying environment has a very large number of 
households. In Townsend (1983), this was a countable infinity and in Greenwood and 
Jovanovic (1990, hereafter referred to as GJ) a continuum of measure or mass equal to 
one. Here, for simplicity of exposition, we imagine the number of households is large but 
finite, so large that in effect the population-weighted sum over households in the financial 
system of any given idiosyncratic shock is zero. One can assume, as in GJ, that all 
idiosyncratic shocks are drawn from a uniform distribution, so one can drop the 
population weights, though here we try to be a bit more general. However, we do not 
want to stray too far from the original work of GJ, as this model was used in the work on 
growth, inequality, and financial repression in Jeong and Townsend (2008) and 
                                                 
9 Puentes (2009) has summarized the annual Townsend Thai data on participation. The biggest innovation 
is the coming of village-level, Million Baht Funds in 2002, but this is after the 1997-2001 panel used here. 
There is a modest increase in the informal sector in the two years after the 1997 financial crisis, but, again, 
this then goes back down to its previous level, and, in the longer panel not used here, follows a downward 
trend. 
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Townsend and Ueda (2010; 2006), and part of our goal here is to provide some unity by 
testing the assumed micro underpinnings of all those models.  
Preferences. Each household i has a contemporary utility function ui(cit, ξit), 
where cit is consumption of household i at date t and ξit is a preference shock determining 
marginal utility. This shock is orthogonal to all other random variables other than its own 
past. Each household i seeks to maximize the discounted time separable flow of 
contemporary utilities at discount rate β. The preference shock ξit has an autoregressive 
structure: ξi,t+1 = ρ ξit + υit where υit is i.i.d. over individuals and time and ρ is potentially 
zero. When ρ is greater than zero, some information on future preference shocks, that is, 
future urgency of consumption, is known at present, hence known in particular at the time 
of the participation decision, t = 0. As preferences are never observed by us as 
econometricians, this creates a potential endogeneity problem: The error term in the 
impact equations over the sample period can be correlated with the participation decision 
(and we will need instruments to correct for this). On the other hand, if ρ = 0, and the 
model is true, no such problem exists (and OLS will not be biased). We report both the 
OLS and IV regressions though we feature the latter as more robust.10 Note that we can 
allow as well a common multiplicative preference shock in the utility function below. 
The empirical risk-sharing regression in consumption allows this, in the common time 
fixed effect, but naturally enough, one cannot identify, from the shadow price of 
                                                 
10 The model here abstracts away from elastic labor supply. As is well known, if a utility function were 
non-separable in consumption and leisure, then even in an optimal allocation of risk bearing, consumption 
could move with an income term. In this paper, we focus on the differential response to income of those 
with financial access and those without, and as that is determined by (plausibly exogenous) instruments, 
there should be no differential due to this effect. We also test the null that those who are fully insured have 
zero coefficients on income, and are sometimes unable to reject this. Nevertheless endogeneity of labor 
supply remains a concern. 
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consumption, a distinction between shortage of aggregate resources and common urgency 
of consumption.  
Technology. To focus on the financial participation, we abstract from occupation 
choice and imagine that each household i is tagged with an initial occupation that does 
not change. For those in agriculture and business, we collapse them into one sector and 
give them a production technology qit = fi(kit, θt + εit), where kit is the capital stock of 
household i at date t, θt + εit is a composite technology shock, and output is measured in 
common units of consumption. Here θt represents a common, aggregate disturbance 
which is i.i.d over time and the idiosyncratic shock єit is i.i.d both over time and over 
households.11    
Investment. There is also a cost of adjustment function gi(Iit, kit, ωit) where Iit is 
investment of household i at t and ωit is an i.i.d. household-specific shock to the cost of 
capital stock adjustment. The law of motion for capital with depreciation rate δ is 
standard: ki,t+1 = (1 - δ)kit + Iit. Note that under the assumed costly adjustment function, 
investment can be negative, but it is costly to convert capital to the consumption good. 
Again, the population-weighted sum of these idiosyncratic shocks ωit is zero so that ex 
post, for households in the financial sector, full insurance sets that sum to zero in 
consumption. But each shock enters into its own real production technology, making one 
technology different from another, so the ωit matters for investment decisions even 
including those households in the financial sector. 
                                                 
11 Townsend and Ueda (2010; 2006) show that the endogenously evolving wealth distribution can generate 
an autoregressive process on income, despite the i.i.d. specification on θt in the technology. 
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Wage earners. There is a group of wage earning households who are not engaged 
in farming or running businesses of any kind. These households have an exogenous 
income process yit which is not influenced by decisions such as capital investment. To 
simplify the notation, especially in the equivalent-with-complete-markets setting with 
financial participation, we give these households what would appear to be the same 
production technology as above, namely, ),( ittitiit kfq εθ +=  but with a fixed kit, and so it 
must be understood that kit is simply a constant, not business capital. Thus, for wage 
earners, only the aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks appear in income yit,12 but, 
obviously, both of the latter are allowed. When a wage earning household i is in financial 
autarky, then we make explicit that household i has an initial beginning-of-period stock 
of savings sit and can save an increment Sit, the difference between income and 
consumption, carrying all savings over into the next period. Note that lowercase and 
uppercase letters distinguish stocks and flows in both savings and capital. To be yet more 
comparable to the earlier investment technology, this savings can depreciate at rate δ and 
suffers a cost-of-adjustment gi(Sit, sit, ωit). Wage earning households participating in the 
financial sector would never use this technology for saving, as it is assumed to be strictly 
dominated in return by the real capital investment technologies. Wage earning 
households who do not participate in the financial sector do use the saving technology, 
since by assumption, as wage earners, they do not have the higher yield production 
technology available to them. This savings thus represents something like rice in storage, 
which depreciates. But again, to economize on notation below, we often replace sit by kit 
for these households. 
                                                 
12 The cost of this is that kit has a time date and it may appear as well that it is part of each and every 
household’s state variable. But this should be suppressed when referring to wage earning households. We 
come back to this in our treatment of the data later. 
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Timeline and decision-making. To fix the timeline for initial decisions at t = 0, 
household i occupation, all initial preference shocks ξi0, technology shocks θ0 + εi0, 
adjustment cost shocks ωi0 and initial asset conditions ki0 (or savings si0) are pre-
determined. Initially, the household can only see the sum, θ0 + εi0. Then a financial 
participation decision is made, and, if positive, a cost Zi is subtracted from capital ki0 (or 
savings). Toward the end of the period, consumption and investment (or savings) 
decisions are made, in coordination with the bank or in autarky, depending on the 
participation decision, respectively. 
Consider the decision-making of a household (of any occupation, replacing k by s 
as necessary) in period t = 0. Let Vi(ki0 – Zi, ξi0, θ0 + εi0, ωi0) denote the discounted 
expected utility value of participating in the financial system. Note that Zi subtracts from 
wealth ki0 (or saving). By the end of the period, participating households benefit from full 
insurance, from the next year on. Likewise, let Wi(ki0, ξi0, θ0 + εi0, ωi0) denote the 
discounted expected utility of those households who choose financial autarky. These 
households retain their capital ki0 (or savings) and see only θt + εit in all future time 
periods, as by assumption they cannot distinguish between them. Now let a binary 
variable Pi0 denote financial participation. With this notation, household i chooses 
whether to participate as a member of a formal financial sector using the following 
decision rule:  
Pi0 = 1 if  ),,,(),,,( 0000000000 iiiiiiiiiii kWZkV ωεθξωεθξ +≥+−  
Pi0 = 0 otherwise. 
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To anticipate what follows, after having made the participation decision, the 
solution of the appropriate dynamic programming problems, derived in detail below, will 
give us policy functions for consumption c and investment I (or saving).  
(Insert Table 1 here) 
tc  is aggregate consumption of those in the financial sector.  Here λi is the Pareto-
weight of household i, determined upon entry into the financial sector at t = 0 by initial 
wealth ki0 – Zi and shocks θt, εi0, and ωi0. In the data, we see versions of these policy 
functions for all households that also depend on the participation decision P. That is, all 
households have consumption functions, but which one we see depends on the 
participation decision P. As some part of the policy functions has unobserved 
idiosyncratic shocks ξit, the error term is also a function of P. With serial correlation, this 
creates the potential endogeneity problem which requires the use of instruments to net out 
selection effects and truly gauge the impact of the financial participation.13  
4. The Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing and Investment for Financial sector 
Participants 
For those participating in the financial sector, the set of Pareto optimal 
consumption and investment allocations are determined as if from a programming 
problem. In addition, we employ a decentralized complete markets version of the 
programming problem to better interpret the solution. This will give us the value function 
                                                 
13 Selection effects can make OLS regressions quite distinct from those of IV or other corrections. See 
Townsend and Urzua (2009) for various examples using data generated from models themselves. Though 
we deal with selection, we restrict ourselves here to the case where IV and weighted averages of local 
treatment effects coincide. See Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) for more general treatments. 
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),,,( 00000 iiiiii ZkV ωεθξ +− , the contemporary initial policies for household i in 1996, 
which are before we have the sampled data, and the policy functions cit and Iit for all 
0>t , just enumerated above in Table 1. 
Suppose there are a large but finite number of households, i = 1, 2, … N, who are 
participating in the financial system, where again N is large enough so that the sum of 
i.i.d. population-weighted idiosyncratic shocks is essentially zero. Denote ht as the whole 
history of shocks through date t and ht as the contemporary date t realization only. In 
principle, this aggregate state ht includes the contemporary realization of idiosyncratic 
shocks for household i, },,,{ itittitith ωεθξ= so the aggregate state is a long vector over all 
households i. But, with a large number of households in the financial sector, the fraction 
of households at various configurations of idiosyncratic shocks is all that matters for the 
aggregate, and as this configuration is virtually constant over all dates and states, it can 
be suppressed when we talk about aggregate shocks. Still, what matters for household i is 
its own position; that is, its shock hit inclusive of household i idiosyncratic shocks ξit, εit, 
ωit as embedded in the aggregate shock ht. So when we refer to a decentralized decision 
of household i, hit is embedded in ht, as if it were written out explicitly. Finally, to be 
consistent with the notation, there is an initial aggregate state h0 and the initial preference 
shock is in h0, so with serial correlation, the future aggregate shock and idiosyncratic 
shock probabilities are conditioned on these. We thus write prob (ht | h0).  Occasionally 
we drop h0 when it does not cause any confusion. 
The programming problem under complete insurance and credit markets is to 
maximize the Pareto-weighted sum of households expected utilities:   
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( )( ) 001 1 iiii IZkk +−−= δ  at t = 0.  (6) 
The first-order condition for consumption is  
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t
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tt
i hcuhhprob μξβλ =′  at t > 0 (7) 
Where μ(ht)is the Lagrange multiplier for (2), which is equivalent to the multiplier in (3). 
This first equation equates weighted marginal utilities of consumption over all 
households. 
We now derive the first-order condition for investment (Euler equation) where the 
contemporary marginal cost of investment is equated to the future marginal revenue from 
production, summing over future states, as expressed in the next equation: 
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(8) 
We can exploit the equivalence between Pareto optimal allocations and 
competitive equilibria to decentralize the problem, hence further characterize the 
investment equation by tying it into existing literature. Specifically, let the price of 
consumption at date t under state ht be equal to the Lagrange multiplier, that is, fix p(ht) 
= μ(ht). We can arbitrarily choose the numéraire to be the price of consumption at date 0. 
Again we note that the pricing function depends on aggregate states, those things which   
determine the marginal utility of (aggregate) consumption, and that prices do not depend 
on idiosyncratic shocks. However, a household can purchase insurance against 
idiosyncratic shocks, and as there is no aggregate risk involved, that insurance will be 
priced at its actuarial value. More specifically, a household can buy insurance that gives 
an indemnity for low idiosyncratic income shocks and sell insurance that effectively pays 
out when the issuer household has high income. The price of each is simply the 
associated probability. Thus the net purchase price of the indemnity/premia bundle is 
zero as its actuarial value is simply the probability weighted sum of idiosyncratic shocks, 
and the latter is zero by construction (see the initial assumption in the environment of the 
model). Then the problem for household i under complete markets is:  
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( ) ( ) ( ) ittittit Ihkhk +−= −+ 11 1 δ  for t > 0 (11) 
( )( ) 001 1 iiii IZkk +−−= δ . (12) 
The wealth of household i at t = 0 upon entering the financial system is 
determined by initial capital ki0 minus entry cost Zi and the initial shocks, including εi0 
and ωi0. The solution to this maximization problem is again ),,,( 00000 iiiiii ZkV ωεθξ +− . 
The first-order condition for investment is the following equation: 
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It is explicit in this market context that the marginal cost of investment inclusive 
of adjustment costs on the left-hand side of (13) is equal to the net marginal revenue 
product on the right-hand side of (13), which is revenue less costs of adjustment. This is 
the same investment rule as was previously derived under the programming problem. 
More to the point, the usual separation theorem applies, and we can determine investment 
independent of household utility or wealth. Though firm size matters as it enters into the 
cost of adjustment, the “firm” in this competitive complete markets setting will simply 
maximize profits at date  t = 0 choosing current investment and future plans: 
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by choice of investment Ii0 and state-and-date-contingent investments Iit(ht). This delivers 
exactly the same investment behavior. Furthermore, multiplying and dividing by 
probabilities at each date and state, this is also equivalent with maximizing the discounted 
expected stream of dividends (namely, consumption) where the discount rate appears 
stochastic but is actually just a renormalization of prices divided by probabilities. This 
then looks like the risk neutral firm of the investment literature.  
 
5. Autarky 
We now turn to the problem of households who do not participate in the financial 
sector and so are entirely on their own. It is best to distinguish here those who can invest 
in farm and other business with income yit = qit gross of costs of adjustment (costs which 
we do not observe) and those wage earners with income yit as a function of θt and εit who 
do not invest in productive technologies, though the notation is similar in the end. For 
both we ignore demographics. For the former group with investment, the problem is: 
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The Euler equation is familiar:  
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For wage earners, just replace flows I with S and stock k with s and function f as 
described earlier. That is, replace ( )ittitkf εθ +,  with a separate term of income 
( )ittity εθ + gross of savings adjustment costs, which we do not observe, and of course add 
to the resource constraint initial stock s0. Stock of savings sit accumulates as in the law of 
motion for capital above at depreciation rate δ. We do not treat the stocks of savings at 
the beginning of the period t as a real capital asset but rather something retained and 
unobserved in the backyard (unproductive) storage technology. 
 
6. Empirical Strategy 
The empirical implementation of the general problem will make use of additional 
assumptions on the functional forms for preferences and technology, convenient for 
obtaining closed-form solutions or linear approximations to the consumption and 
investment policy functions. We follow the empirical strategies in the existing literature 
on consumption smoothing (Townsend 1994, among others) and on investment financing 
(Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1999, among others), but again we use the common 
derivation from the given model for both. 
24 
Consumption policy equation with financial participation. To be yet more 
specific about within-household members’ allocations, suppose the utility function of 
member k of household j is of the form ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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ξ exp1),(  where ktA  is 
a gender-age weight of member k determined by metabolic requirements. Then, adjusting 
for these metabolic requirements by age and gender of the Nit members k of household i, 
assuming common risk aversion, σ, common preference shocks, and equal within-
household Pareto weights, we obtain from (7) the following equation:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) itN
k
k
t
N
k
k
tN
j
N
k
k
t
N
k
k
t
k
tN
j
N
k
k
t
N
k
k
t
k
tN
j
ji
N
k
k
t
N
k
k
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
j
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
A
c
N
A
AA
N
A
AA
N
A
c
ξ
σ
λλ
σ
++
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−=
∑
∑∑
∑
∑∑
∑
∑∑
∑
∑
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1
log
1
log
1log1log1  (15) 
Here the dependent variable is the per-capita (weighted)14 consumption of 
household i, cit. The first term on the right-hand side is the household-specific fixed 
effect, which is essentially household i’s relative λ-weight. Note that the average weight 
in the population is virtually constant, as it is assumed in equilibrium a large number of 
households have entered and the impact of household i on the sum is negligible. This first 
term is denoted fi in equation (16) below. The second term on the right-hand side is a 
demographic term reflecting the age-adjusted number of members Ntj of household j 
relative to the aggregate risk-sharing group, the set of financial participants. In principle, 
as in Townsend (1994), this may move over time, but here we suppose it to be constant, 
and we have verified this makes little difference in the empirical specification below. 
Hence this term does not appear in equation (16) below. The final term is the average 
                                                 
14 ICRISAT weights are calculated following Townsend (1994). 
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consumption of financial participants. In practice, that latter term is replaced by a 
common, time-specific fixed effect to avoid biases and to have power against alternative 
hypotheses (Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997). This then is term dt in equation (16) below, 
as determined by the Lagrange multiplier.15 In sum, we can express each term of equation 
(15) for household i with the following notation in (16):  
ittiiit ddemfc ξ+++= . (16) 
The main point here is that consumption depends on income only through the 
common fixed-effect dt. 
Investment policy equation with financial participation. The production 
function is imagined to be linear in capital and multiplicative in the shocks: 
( ) ( ) itittittitiit kkfq εθεθ +=+= , . This makes the average and marginal product of capital 
easy to compute (if the data came from the model). The adjustment cost function takes 
the form )(
2
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IkIg ++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
= ωω , where bi is a household-i specific fixed 
effect. Note that taking the derivative of the function g with respect to investment I gives 
a partially closed form decision rule for investment with fixed effect bi and an additive 
unobserved error ωit as the marginal cost of adjustment. Further, under as-if-complete 
markets, this gives the empirical specification of the investment equation used in the 
literature. In summary, both the investment and consumption equations of the literature 
                                                 
15 This is the intuition for why we can also accommodate common aggregate preference shocks, which also 
show up in the Lagrange multiplier. 
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are derived in the next section from a common foundation based on the optimal allocation 
of risk. Note that subscript i can now be deleted from functions ( ) ( )⋅⋅ ii fu , , and ( )⋅ig .  
Under the thus assumed functional forms for f and g, we can substitute into the 
equation of marginal utility of consumption and costs/return on investment in Euler 
equation (13) above to get: 
( ) ( )1
2
1,
1,
1,1
1
2
1)(1 +
+
+
++∑
+
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+++ t
h ti
ti
tit
t
itt
it
it hp
k
I
hpb
k
I
t
εθω .
 
(17) 
Note first in equation (17) that Iit/kit is already on the left-hand side, and while bi 
and ω are as well, they can easily be moved the right-hand side, as in equation (18) 
below, switching signs. Next, as in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999), one can rewrite the 
Euler equation (17) at t + 1, and then with the original equation (17) at t we derive with 
substitution an overall equation in three periods, t, t + 1, and t + 2. Then, continuing in 
this way, making repeated substitutions for the investment-to-capital ratios one can derive 
an expression on the right-hand side which is a nonlinear function of θt over all future t 
and the contingent prices over all future t. The price of an idiosyncratic shock such as 
1, +tiε is simply its probability, as that shock does not influence the aggregate state and it 
averages out in the population. Thus, as anticipated, adding up the probability-weighted 
sum, with some terms negative and some positive, delivers the mean, namely zero. What 
remains on the right-hand side, both current and future prices and aggregate shocks, are 
common to all the households in the financial sector and thus are captured by a single 
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common time dummy. This is dt in equation (18) below.16 The main point is that 
household investment depends on the aggregate fixed effect dt and not on household 
income. The normalization with respect to kit gets rid of household specific technology 
effects except for the marginal cost shifter ωit. Then, linearizing, again as in Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1999):  
itit
it
it bdconst
k
I
ω+++= 1 .
 
(18) 
Consumption and investment equations under financial autarky. In the 
autarky problem, consumption is determined at the same time as investment for 
households running businesses, or at the same time as savings for wage earners, and so 
consumption will be captured by similar equations to investment. The relevant state 
variables are { }itittititk ωεθξ ,,, +  and we write the policy functions as follows: 
( )itittititiit kII ωεθξ ,,, +=  and ( )itittititiit kcc ωεθξ ,,, += . For wage earners, again replace k 
with s and I with S. But again, we do not track savings the way we do for investment by 
businesses, and so there are no investment equations to be estimated for wage earners. 
The key point is that the current state for a household at the time of making the joint 
consumption and investment (or savings) decision includes current income plus other 
idiosyncratic shocks to preferences and adjustment costs. That is, for farms and business, 
the state includes both the contemporaneous shocks θt + εit and also kit. Current income is 
qit = kit (θt + εit), and as we have already included the contemporaneous shocks, the 
                                                 
16 This is related to dt in the consumption equation though not identical to it. We do not test the two 
equations jointly, so the distinction does not matter. 
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capital piece kit is the only thing otherwise left out of qit. With the linear approximation 
we include each term separately.  
In sum, the linear approximation of the policy functions for those in financial 
autarky, replacing θt + εit  by qit/kit  are, for consumption  
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where χit captures both ξit and ωit; and, for investment 
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where itυ
~  captures again both ξit and ωit. Now, as in equation (17) above for those in as-
if-complete markets, we normalize investment by the scale of the capital stock: 
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(21) 
In this specification, with the error term now normalized by k, it is natural to check for 
heteroskedasticity.   
Impact equations of financial participation. Observed consumption and 
investment at time t > 0 for those households i participating in the financial sector Pi0 = 1 
and in financial autarky Pi0 = 0 can be written by using equations (16), (18), (19) and 
(21): 
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(23) 
By rearranging terms and taking first differences, and letting 1−−=Δ ttt ddd , we 
rid ourselves of household-specific effects and get the following impact equations for 
changes in consumption and investment-per-unit capital: 
( )[ ]itiiti
it
it
iititiit PPk
qPkPdPc ξχηη Δ+Δ−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛Δ−+Δ−+Δ=Δ 0010000 1)1()1(  (24) 
[ ]itiiti
it
it
it
iti
it
it PvP
k
k
q
PdP
k
I
ωφ Δ+Δ−+⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
Δ−+Δ=Δ 00100 )1()1( . (25) 
If the idiosyncratic shock ξit is i.i.d., then the error terms in equations (24) and 
(25) are i.i.d., and the participation decision Pio taken at t = 0 would be independent of 
error terms in the impact equations, which implies in turn that the OLS estimates of 
financial participation impact are unbiased. However, allowing serial correlation in the 
idiosyncratic shock ξit will make OLS estimates biased and would require Instrumental 
Variable (IV) estimation. Note that cost Zi does not affect potential levels of consumption 
or investment other than in the initial date before our sample periods, but cost Zi does 
affect the initial choice of financial participation. In this sense, Zi in the theory is a valid 
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instrument for the participation decision. The question is then what instrument we 
employ in the data. IV estimation requires finding variables in the data that are correlated 
with the cost of participation but uncorrelated with initial shocks ξi0, ωi0, θ0 and εi0.  
Note that q / k appears in the consumption and investment equations for those 
autarky households running firms and businesses, but not for wage earners who have no 
k, only wage income. For empirical purposes we now put q / k in units of income for both 
groups. That is, we run a simple linear regression of income onto q / k each year one at a 
time for farms/businesses, and then use the rescaled predicted value. Note that this 
income term is just a linear function of q / k. For wage earners we need not run a 
regression and we just use reported income. This in first differences is “income change”, 
one of the variables on the right-hand side of the consumption equation. The other term in 
the consumption equation is capital change. We ran this specification and conducted 
robustness checks with its exclusion. Results are not sensitive, so capital change is 
dropped from results reported in Table 4 below. This also has the advantage of making 
the autarky consumption equation more comparable to the empirical literature. The 
investment equation is run only for farms and businesses and is already scaled by k so 
there is no need to include k on the right-hand side. Finally, in earlier work (Alem and 
Townsend 2004) we included demographic effects in levels and all interaction terms, 
though this specification does not come from the theory. Results are largely similar.17  
                                                 
17 Specifically, control Xj96 is an expanded vector of household j characteristics including age, wealth, 
gender, and also other demographic terms (number of adult males, adult females and children). Control Zji96 
is a vector of characteristics for village i of household j. From the Townsend Thai data we include average 
wealth of the village and average education. We also include measured CDD village characteristics such as 
fraction of households with piped water and state supplied electricity, number of households with migrants 
outside the village, whether there is a village assembly hall, fraction of households in agriculture, in cottage 
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Instruments. We employ several candidates as instruments for Zi and test them as 
over-identifying restrictions (OIR) as we describe below. Each instrument has its strength 
and limitations, and they all consist of alternative measures of the cost of financial 
participation Zi based on geographic variation, as in Card (1995).18   
 Headman Response (HEAD): The key informant of a particular village in the 
Townsend Thai survey answers retrospective questions delivering the history of 
institution use, in particular the presence of a named institution in the base year, 1996. 
That is, were there any households who were clients or used the services of a named 
financial institution? This seems likely correlated with whether an individual is a member 
or a customer, particularly so for institutions that operate at the village level only or 
institutions that target or expand at the village level (less so for Commercial Banks, for 
example). This instrument is not available for informal borrowing or savings. 
 Time to District Center (TIME): CDD data estimates travel times from the village 
to District Centers. These are used as instruments for all formal institutions, though it is 
questionable a priori if there is relevance in this for village institutions. Commercial 
                                                                                                                                                 
industries, in paddy production, and fraction receiving government assistance, and with multiple 
occupations. The Xj and Zji are all dated 1996 and all entered in both levels and interacted with income 
change. The goal is to have as many controls as possible for consumption and investment change to extract 
out the incremental smoothing effect of membership in an institution. 
18 This strategy is vulnerable to the possibility that financial institutions choose where to operate based on 
the risk sharing capabilities of their borrowers. Though not implausible, there are indications of other 
motives in the data: Commercial banks cluster around towns as if a more aggressive strategy of lending to 
farmers or putting branches or mobile vans in rural areas were inconsistent with Bank of Thailand 
regulation. The BAAC tends over time to try to establish a branch in every county. Here we treat the 
placement as random, though clearly this at best an approximation, and focus on the choice of potential 
customers given branch location. It is clear from CDD data that households can travel non-trivial distances 
to get to somewhat distant branches. It is the cost of doing this that rationalizes several of the instruments 
we use. Ongoing work with Assuncao, Mityakov and Townsend (2010) is exploring these issues in detail 
but not enough is known at present to incorporate here. 
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banks might be supposed to operate near district centers, and the BAAC may target poor 
farmers far off the main road. 
 Geographic Information System (GIS): We also created from CDD data another 
instrument for financial participation that indicates institutional presence in 1996. Again,  
Headmen of all villages in Thailand are asked in the CDD survey whether anyone in the 
village has access to credit from each one of several named institutions such as village 
funds, commercial banks, agricultural cooperatives, and traders or suppliers of inputs (as 
a proxy for the informal sector). As all villages in each of the survey provinces have been 
vectorized in a GIS, we can use the responses from nearby villages in 1996 to create a 
weighted membership variable for each of the villages of the Townsend Thai survey.19 
The GIS variable has several advantages. First, the response of any given headman may 
be inaccurate, so with presumed spatial correlation, the averaging is removing some 
measurement error. Second, we can impute values to villages that otherwise are missing 
headmen responses. Third, there may be supply-side variation: For example, village 
funds (PCG’s) are promoted by energetic local officials responsible for tambons or 
amphoes. 
 The instruments we have chosen are by and large correlated with active 
participation in the base year and subsequent use of the financial institutions, as shown in 
Table 2. In many other applications with limited data, being a customer or member 
                                                 
19 Specifically every pixel is assigned a number by weighting the nearest 12 villages to the center of the 
pixel, the weight falling inversely with distance. Thus every village, including those of the Townsend Thai 
data, can be assigned an indicator. The weights and number of villages used were chosen to produce non-
trivial variation, between zero and one, so that on average there is neither too little nor too much damping. 
Robustness checks with alternative specifications were performed. 
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cannot be checked directly with actual subsequent use, so here again a panel which asks 
about savings and borrowing transactions by provider has its huge advantages. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Method. We use Instrumental Variables (IV) as the benchmark case but employ   
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) when the presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
error term makes IV estimates of standard errors inconsistent. Assuming conditional 
homoskedasticity, we calculate an IV estimator in two stages, test for the validity of sets 
of instruments as over-identifying restrictions (OIR), and report the Sargan statistic. We 
test for heteroskedasticity as in Pagan and Hall (1983), and when indicated, we use GMM 
and report Hansen J-statistics for the validity of instruments. We first test for the validity 
of the three instruments, and if this is rejected we test for the various combinations of 
instruments pair-wise. The advantage of GMM in overcoming heteroskedasticity comes 
with a cost, as Hayashi (2000) points out, which is that estimates of the optimal 
weighting matrix require a very large sample size. We come back to this issue when we 
report results.  
 Table 3 reports statistics on the relevance and validity of instruments employed on 
each financial institution for both consumption and investment impact equations. The 
first column presents the Shea (1997) partial R2 measure for (time) dummies interacted 
with measured participation P0, and the second column the income coefficient interacted 
with measured participation P0. Results indicate that the instruments are largely 
correlated with these endogenous variables, which is what we expected. There are 
exceptions. Note in particular that the partial correlation of instruments in the income 
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column for Agricultural Cooperatives and PCG in the consumption specification are low, 
to anticipate future results. This is also true for Agriculture Cooperatives in the 
investment specification. The third column reports the p-value of the Pagan-Hall (1983) 
test for the presence of heteroskedasticity in the error term. It was found that the null 
hypothesis of conditional homoskedasticity is not rejected for the consumption 
specification, but it is uniformly rejected at 1% in the case of the investment equation. 
The investment equation is thus estimated using the GMM instead of IV, and again we 
anticipate weaker results. The last two columns report the p-value of the over-identifying 
restrictions test, and we present in the last column the combination of instruments for 
which the Sargan/Hansen statistic did not reject the null hypothesis of validity of 
instruments. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
 
7. The impact of financial institutions 
 Tables 4 and 5 present the estimates of consumption and investment impact 
equations (24) and (25), respectively. The first column reports the point estimates (and p-
values) of the time-varying constant that measures consumption/investment co-
movements for members of the particular institution under analysis (BAAC, Commercial 
Banks, Agricultural Cooperatives, PCG and the Informal Sector). The second column 
reports the sensitivity of consumption/investment to income changes for non-participants 
of the financial institution, and the third column measures the effect of financial 
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participation on the income coefficient sensitivity (that is, income change sensitivity for 
members is the sum of the second and third columns). Finally, the last, fourth column, 
tests the complete-markets-full-insurance hypothesis for financial participants. 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Summary of results. The BAAC is the most helpful institution in the sense that it 
helps both in consumption and investment. The sensitivity of consumption to income 
changes is highest for those non-members of BAAC under IV estimation, but it is fully 
undone for members in the IV specification, that is, members of the BAAC seem to enjoy 
full insurance against income shocks (see the results in the last column). For investment, 
both OLS and IV indicate that the BAAC has a favorable impact, though the impact of 
the financial institution on the income coefficient (P0η1) subtracts too much and 
consequently the complete markets hypothesis of the last column is rejected (at p-value 
0.000). But see below for further discussion on this last point. The instruments employed 
are correlated with subsequent use of both savings and credit (Table 2), though TIME has 
a somewhat weaker correlation with subsequent use and is not a valid instrument in 
consumption regression. Note that TIME has a positive correlation as more distant 
customers are better served, consistent with the premise that BAAC customers are 
usually located off road, so to speak. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
 What is the characteristic of the BAAC that allows this beneficial effect?  
Townsend and Yaron (2001) examine this in a study of the BAAC risk contingency 
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system. When a farmer experiences an adverse shock during crop production, either 
idiosyncratic illness which impedes farming, or an aggregate shock such as flood or 
drought, then this is reported and verified if necessary by a BAAC field officer. The 
BAAC can then extend the loan, and sometimes will forgive some of the (compound) 
interest due and/or forgive some of the principal. The funds for this come from the central 
government and are a line item in the BAAC accounts. In effect, the government is 
paying a premium for insurance, while the farmers clearly receive an indemnity. The 
point is that this de facto insurance arrangement is tailored around the farmers’ actual 
situation and so a priori one might think that it would show up in consumption and 
investment smoothing. Evidently this is the case. 
Commercial banks are also helpful. In consumption smoothing, similar to the 
BAAC, the impact of income changes on consumption is mitigated by financial 
participation, again significant in the IV. For investment, the OLS specification indicates 
a reduction in idiosyncratic risk, but that is not the case for the IV specification. It is 
interesting that for commercial banks all three instruments (GIS, HEAD, TIME) are 
valid, always. For commercial banks the correlation in Table 2 of the instrument Time to 
District Center with subsequent use is negative, as one might anticipate, that is, nearby 
customers are better served, so to speak. The negative sign on the instrument HEAD is a 
puzzle. 
For Agricultural Cooperatives and PCG/Village Funds it appears that customers 
are as vulnerable as non-customers to shocks with respect to consumption. The sign is 
negative for most specifications, but it is not statistically significant. With respect to 
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investment, the sign is perverse and significant in one case. These two institutions do not 
appear helpful. Related perhaps, in Table 2, the correlation of the instruments with 
subsequent use displays weak results for Agricultural Cooperatives.  
 The Informal Sector presents neutral if not perverse results with respect to the 
smoothing of consumption from income shocks. Surprisingly, the favorable impact, 
though overdone, is in investment (the F-test for complete markets is rejected), though 
again see the discussion immediately following. Also, it seems it is the savings part (rice 
storage), and not the informal borrowing part, which is picked up by the instruments 
(TIME and GIS). Note the instrument TIME has a positive coefficient, as again more 
distance from the district center means more use of rice storage.  
As noted earlier, the coefficients in the IV regressions in investment for the 
BAAC and the informal sector are negative and significantly different from zero, an odd 
result. We have investigated this further. In the data used in this paper, the result for the 
BAAC appears to be driven by low wealth households: if we drop the bottom 15% then 
there is no net response to idiosyncratic risk, as the theory of full risk sharing implies, 
i.e., full risk-sharing. In contrast, dropping high wealth households, different treatment of 
outliers, and different treatment of zero investment events seem not to impact the result in 
Table 5. The odd result for the informal sector and investment remains despite all these 
robustness checks. However, results may be due to some kind of measurement error in 
the annual data rather than anything substantive economically. In a different monthly data 
set, but also for Thailand and these same provinces, Samphantharak and Townsend 
(2009) do not find negative coefficients on either rich or poor households. Ongoing work 
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by Kinnan and Townsend (forthcoming) with that same monthly data find that the BAAC 
and also commercial banks are helping in smoothing consumption (perfectly) and 
investment (partially); further, there is no over-correction. Indeed, in the  more detailed 
monthly data where we know who is related to whom, and whether households give gifts 
and transfers to each other, it seems indirect connections of a household to these formal 
lenders can be quite helpful, either in smoothing along the equilibrium path, as for 
consumption, or punishing off-equilibrium behavior, as for investment. These results are 
preliminary, however.  
8. Additional Results and Interpretation 
 As with the macro aggregates featured in the literature on the Asian financial crisis, 
the first two years after the 1997 crisis correspond with drops in income and other key 
variables, and the last year of the data corresponds with a recovery, especially so in the 
Central Region. But despite the prevalence of aggregate shocks in income, consumption 
and investment, idiosyncratic shocks abound. Part of this can be explained by 
distinguishing income source and occupation group. For example, incomes did not drop 
on average in these data for wage earners and those receiving remittances, unlike the 
presumptions which underlay safety net targeting. Business on the other hand did suffer 
income drops. Still, within each occupation category there remains considerable 
idiosyncratic variation, evident in the histograms of income change. Thus an analysis of 
the optimal allocation of risk is appropriate for these data. 
 The analysis of risk-sharing indicates there is little pattern by age and gender of the 
household head, groups which are typically thought of as being in need of safety net 
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targeting. The least educated are more vulnerable, but there are exceptions. The most 
salient finding is that wealth does matter, and the poor are uniformly more vulnerable in 
both consumption and investment.  
 Stratifications by wealth and a frequency-of-use analysis with transactions data 
seem to confirm a stereotypical picture of the literature: The poor lack access to formal 
credit and insurance markets and are more reliant on remittances, moneylenders, and the 
informal sector. They also seem more reliant on rice storage and livestock sales. The rich 
have access to formal credit and use informal lending, savings in financial institutions, 
and household and productive assets. However, when the transactions data are coupled 
with the consumption, income, and investment data, a strikingly different pattern 
emerges. Partial correlation coefficients of consumption-income deficits and investment- 
income deficits with the various potential smoothing devices show that the poor segment 
of the population are heavy users of formal credit, for both consumption and investment 
smoothing. Informal borrowing is used more by the middle and upper wealth groups. 
Likewise remittances, though used by all, seems relatively more important to the middle 
and upper wealth groups. What remains of the stereotypical picture of the literature is that 
the poor, and middle, segments are users of rice storage and the rich use savings in formal 
institutions.  
 Stratifying by institution we find that the middle and upper classes by wealth do 
seem to use commercial bank savings accounts to smooth consumption, running down 
savings when there is a gap between consumption and income. Commercial bank lending 
is available to few households. In contrast, we find in the transaction data that both 
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borrowing and saving with BAAC are helpful in consumption smoothing for the 
relatively poor. This result helps us interpret the OLS and IV regressions. For example, 
for village level quasi-formal financial institutions, we find in the transactions data that 
movements in PCG credit and saving accounts do help smooth consumption, though only 
for the rich, and smooth investment, but only for the middle group. An analysis of the 
informal sector and the transactions data shows for consumption that informal borrowing 
is helpful and significant under stratifications for the middle class only, not the poor. 
Money lenders in particular serve the middle segment of the market. Regarding 
investment, consistent with Tables 4 and 5, the transactions data show that informal 
borrowing is helpful for the middle and rich, again with money lenders serving the 
middle segment. Remittances help only the middle segment also. Storeowner credit helps 
the rich (and to a lesser extent the poor, an exception). The conclusion again is that the 
informal sector helps the wealthier groups. In contrast, here but not in Table 4, informal 
savings in the form of buffer stocks is helpful in smoothing consumption for the poor and 
middle wealth segments of the surveyed population.   
 
9. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents a theory-based assessment of the impact of financial 
institutions at the micro level, beyond financial statements and stand-alone financial 
indicators. Access to financial institutions, as predicted from the theory, entails 
substantial beneficial effects at the household level, particularly in eliminating the 
damaging effect of income variability on consumption and investment. In particular, and 
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consistent with previous analysis (Townsend and Yaron 2001), government development 
banks, usually considered culprits, seem to have a particularly beneficial effect. The more 
general point is that theory and data can be combined to provide a rating of how well 
financial service providers are doing as regards their actual customers and clients in the 
provision of insurance. This link between the ratings of financial institutions and their 
impact is rare. Certainly, the panel data required to do this is not typically available, but 
on the other hand, the knowledge gained can be critical for regulators and policymakers 
as they try to assess how well a given financial system is functioning and whether or not 
there can be improvements.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Policy Functions for the Different Financial Regimes 
  Consumption Investment 
Pi0 =  1 
(participation) 
for all t > 0 cit = ci (λi, ξit , tc ) Iit = Ii (kit, ωit , tc ) 
Pi0 =  0 (autarky)  for all t > 0 cit = ci (kit, ξit ,θt + εit, ωit) Iit = Ii (kit, ξit, θt +εit,ωit)
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Table 2 
Correlation of Instruments (listed in columns 2, 4, 6) with Frequency of Use  
 HEAD P-value TIME P-value GIS P-value
BAAC  
- Borrowing .0869 (.0050) .0675 (.0307) .2115 (.0000)
- Savings .0667 (.0313) .0602 (.0540) .2140 (.0000)
Commercial Banks  
- Borrowing -.0209 (.4995) -.0795 (.0108) .0977 (.0016)
- Savings .0558 (.0714) -.0988 (.0015) .0889 (.0041)
Agric. Cooperatives  
- Borrowing .1062 (.0006) .0045 (.8847) .1818 (.0000)
- Savings .1527 (.0000) -.0013 (.9678) .1897 (.0000)
PCG  
- Borrowing .2186 (.0000) -.0961 (.0020) .1312 (.0000)
- Savings .1943 (.0000) -.0930 (.0028) .1668 (.0000)
Informal sector  
- Borrowing NA - .0174 (.5770) .0098 (.7522)
- Savings (Rice) NA - .1228 (.0001) .0696 (.0244)
Notes: GIS is the Geographical Information System instrument, TIME measures the travel time from the village to the district center 
and HEAD is the response of the Headman to questions about institutional presence. Frequent use is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the household had a transaction with named institution in 3 out of the 4 years in the panel. Note that informal sector 
borrowing is not highly correlated with the two available instruments. 
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Table 3 
Properties of the Instruments 
 Shea (1997) partial 
R2 for endogenous 
variables 
Pagan-Hall (1983) 
Test of 
Heteroskedasticity 
OIR test: 
Sargan/ 
Hansen 
Combinations 
of instrument 
 P0 dt P0 q/k p-value p-value  
Consumption      
BAAC .994 .208 .675 .276 GIS,Head 
Comm. Banks .878 .424 .998 .668 GIS,Head,Time
Agric. Coop. .4160 .0121 .891 .2259 GIS,Time 
PCG .9056 .0984 .911 .1644 GIS,Time 
Informal sector .8747 .3306 .952 .6710 GIS,Time 
Investment      
BAAC .9922 .2300 .004 .8176 GIS,Head,Time
Comm. Banks .8751 .2123 .000 .9158 GIS,Head,Time
Agric. Coop. .8403 .0628 .000 .5266 GIS,Head 
PCG .9273 .2223 .000 .7414 GIS,Head 
Informal sector .8984 .3615 .000 .4915 GIS,Time 
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Table 4 
Impact of Financial Institutions on Consumption Smoothing (Eq. 24) 
 F-test 
P0 dt = 0 
η1 P0 η1 
F-test 
η1+P0 η1= 0 
 (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
BAAC     
OLS 1.66 .249*** -.062 13.04 
 (.157) (.000) (.439) (.000) 
IV 17.21 .571*** -.618*** .31 
 (.002) (.000) (.000) (.578) 
Commercial Banks     
OLS 8.01 .246*** -.094 7.97 
 (.000) (.000) (.234) (.0048) 
IV 29.58 .299*** -.223* 1.08 
 (.000) (.000) (.072) (.300) 
Agric. Cooperatives     
OLS 7.17 .204*** -.006 1.95 
 (.000) (.000) (.966) (.163) 
IV 34.25 .303*** -1.427 .77 
 (.000) (.010) (.304) (.379) 
PCG – Village Funds     
OLS 1.19 .221*** -.116 .33 
 (.313) (.000) (.539) (.567) 
IV 23.82 .196*** .427 1.31 
 (.000) (.000) (.455) (.253) 
Informal Sector     
OLS 4.45 .117*** .223*** 50.35 
 (.001) (.001) (.000) (.000) 
IV 32.70 .156*** .114 13.44 
 (.000) (.001) (.279) (.000) 
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Table 5 
Impact of Financial Institutions on Investment Sensitivity to Shocks (Eq. 25) 
 F-test 
P0 dt = 0 
φ 1 P0 φ1 
F-test 
φ1+P0 φ1= 0 
 (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) (p-value) 
BAAC     
OLS .76 .031*** -.192*** 77.19 
 (.5151) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
IV 3.54 .162*** -1.372*** 270.36 
 (.3150) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
Commercial Banks     
OLS .06 .010*** -.058* 2.26 
 (.983) (.002) (.066) (.133) 
IV 6.54 -.003 .026 .07 
 (.088) (.807) (.739) (.787) 
Agric. Cooperatives     
OLS .00 .010*** .381*** 9.32 
 (.999) (.002) (.003) (.002) 
IV 2.98 -.011 .436 .04 
 (.395) (.403) (.844) (.848) 
PCG – Village Funds     
OLS .03 .010*** .019 .01 
 (.994) (.002) (.956) (.932) 
IV 2.56 -.012 .966 .06 
 (.464) (.473) (.805) (.807) 
Informal Sector     
OLS 1.20 .030*** -.162*** 58.12 
 (.308) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
IV .02 .332*** -2.696*** 90.01 
 (.991) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 
Summary Statistics, 1997 
Variable Description # of obs. Mean St.Dev.
Households variables (total 960)    
Household Consumption (Baht) 924 90964 151241
Household Investment (Baht) 429 13960 96630
Household Income (Baht) 927 76119 232359
Age of Head 912 51 14
Gender of Head (1 if Male) 912 .75 .43
Household Wealth (in Baht) 924 62670 115217
Household Size (members) 923 4.6 1.9
Financial institution participation (total 960)  
Dummy BAAC (1 if member) 884 .29 .46
Dummy Comm. Banks (1 if member) 884 .27 .44
Dummy Agric. Cooperatives (1 if member) 884 .15 .36
Dummy PCG-Village Fund (1 if member) 884 .06 .24
Dummy Informal Sector (1 if informal debt) 793 .59 .49
Instruments for participation   
GIS _ BAAC (village level, total 192) 192 .86 .23
GIS _ Comm. Banks (village level, total 192) 192 .33 .24
GIS _ Cooperatives (village level, total 192) 189 .60 .35
GIS _ Village Funds (village level, total 192) 192 .18 .20
GIS _ Supplier Credit (village level, total 192) 192 .45 .29
HEAD _ BAAC (village level, total 192) 192 .20 .40
HEAD _ Comm. Banks (village level, total 192) 192 .02 .14
HEAD _ Cooperatives (village level, total 192) 192 .09 .28
HEAD _ Village Funds (village level, total 192) 192 .09 .28
TIME to District Center (village level, total 192) 192 .25 .14
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Table A.2 
Summary Statistics, panel data, 1998-2001 
Variable Description # of obs. Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Household variables (total 3840)      
Change in Consumption (Baht) 3682 -5183 46523 -154737 150106
Change in Income (Baht) 3698 -8770 104747 -283033 147934
Change in Investment/Capital (Baht) 2441 -.20 2.47 -12.08 6.46
Capital - Level of Productive Assets (Baht) 3682 61359 78314 0 493790
 
 
 
